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Inasmuch as the undue regard principle now finds anchoring in the Constitution, it is 
unclear what this guiding principle fully entails. This is evinced by the fact that there 
exists neither rules nor judicial pronouncements on what due vis-a-vis undue application 
is and the modalities of application it demands. As a result, there is need for a proper 
delineation of what amounts to due regard to procedural technicalities The aim of this 
research undertaking was to detennine what due regard to procedural technicalities is vis-
a-vis undue regard to procedural technicalities. 
The author sought to analyze the effect of Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution that 
establishes that administration of justice is to be done without undue regard to procedural 
technicalities; to probe if and how courts orchestrate undue regard to procedural 
technicalities in the conduct of their business and assess the effects of undue regard to 
procedural technicalities in the civil justice system. 
The methodology adopted was desk-based research and the tools used were secondary 
data and included analysis of case law from the commonweal_th, the Superior courts of 
Kenya, the Civil Procedure Rules and procedural law texts. 
The chief discussion in the study was the need for predictable test by appraising the 
principle of Legal Certainty and a proposed test to guide the courts in detennining what 
due regard to procedural technicalities is, aided by practice, legal principles and case law. 
The main recommendation was interventions to reform policy and legislation for the 
cessation of undue regard to procedural technicalities by courts and tribunals in Kenya to 
guarantee civil justice. 
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"Wrong must not win by technicalities" 
- Aeschylus, Eumenides 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the Problem 
Access to justice is a fundamental freedom and right anchored in Article 48 of the 
Constitution of Kenya and establishes that the State shall ensure access to justice for 
all persons. The ambit of access to justice invoked in this inquiry is equality of access 
to legal services that aims to ensure that all persons, regardless of means, have access 
to high quality legal services and effective dispute resolution mechanisms necessary 
to protect their rights and interests. 1 Article 159 (2)( d) of the same constitution on 
exercise of judicial authority further asserts the right of access to justice by providing 
that in exercising judicial authmity, courts and tribunals shall be guided by the 
principle that justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedural 
technicalities. 
In conducting their core business of the adjudication of disputes, civil courts in Kenya 
are governed by the Civil Procedure Act, 2 Civil Procedure Rules, 3 Appellate 
Jurisdiction Act,4 Court of Appeal Rules,5 Supreme Court Act6 and the Supreme Court 
Rules. 7 These rules are tailored with the overriding objective of facilitating the just, 
expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of civil disputes governed by the 
Civil Procedure Act. 8 
Be that as it may, there exists neither rules nor judicial pronouncements on what 
'undue'vis-a-vis 'due' regard of procedural technicalities is and its scope of judicial 
application.To that extent, there exists a grave lacuna as courts engage in an 
1 Access to Justice Advisory Committee, Access to justice: An Action Plan, AGPS, Canberra, 1994, p. 
xxx as cited by Louis Schetzer, Joanna Mullins, Robe1io Buonamano in Access to Justice & Legal 
Needs, A project to identify legal needs, pathways and baJTiers for disadvantaged people in NSW 
(2002) 7. 
~Cap 21 , Laws of Kenya. 
3Civil Procedure Rules, Under Section 81 of The Civil Procedure Act (Cap. 21), Legal Notice No. 151 
of 2010 . 
4 Cap 9, Laws of Kenya. 
5 Legislative Supplement No . 43, 2010. 
6 Act No . 7 of2011. 
7 Legal Notice No. 141,2011. 
8 S. 1A, Cap 21; S. 3A, Cap 9. 
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unchecked practice of ascertaining what undue regard to procedural technicalities is. 
This unbridled and one-off determination of undue regard to procedural technicalities 
isnon-judicious as the discretionary application of undue regard at the call of a judge 
who deems it necessary ensures that procedural justice is only served to that particular 
case and not all cases in want. 
1.2 Definition of Terms 
The Dictionary for United States views the term "legal technicality" as a casual or 
colloquial phrase referring to a technical aspect oflaw and that it is not a term of art in 
the law, has no exact meaning and doesn't have a legal definition. 9 That 
notwithstanding, the term implies that strict adherence to the letter of the law prevents 
the spirit of the law from being enforced and is often simply used to denote any 
portion of the law that interferes with the outcome desired by the user of the tem1.10 
Justice Njagi Marete, on his part, in the case of James Mangeli Musoo v Ezeetec 
Limited had similar observations to make with regard to definition of legal 
technicalities. 11 He had the following to say: 
"A technicality, to me is a provision of law or procedure that inhibits 
or limits the direction of pleadings, proceedings and even decisions on 
court matters. Undue regard to technicalities therefore means that the 
court should deal and direct itself without undue consideration of any 
laws, rules and procedures that are technical and or procedural in 
nature. It does not, from the onset or in any way, oust technicalities. It 
only emphasizes a situation where undue regard to these should not be 
had. This is more so where undue regard to technicalities would 
inhibit a just hearing, determination or conclusion of the issues in 
dispute." 12 
Lord Penzance, sitting at the House of Lords in Henry JB Kendall & Others v Peter 
Hamilton set out the point in the following words: 
"Procedure is but the machinery of the law after all, the channel and 
means whereby law is administered and justice reached. It strangely 
9 Technicality, Dictionwy for US, http://dict.us/technicality on 29 January 2016. 
10 As above. 
11 (2014) eKLR. 
11 As above. 
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departs from its proper office when, in place of facilitating, it is 
permitted to obstruct, and even extinguish, legal rights, and is thus 
made to govern where it ought to sub serve" 13 
Indeed, from the above statement, it can be inferred that the rules of procedure, which 
are critical for the functioning of court, exist to aid the court in its functions but with 
the departure of procedure from their purpose being what amounts to undue regard to 
procedural technicalities. 
Sir William Holdsworth, a British legal historian and Vine1ian Professor of English 
law, set forth as follows: 
"One of the most difficult and one of the most permanent problems 
which a legal system must face is a combination of a due regard for the 
claims of substantial justice with a system of procedure rigid enough to 
be workable. It is easy to favour one quality at the expense of the other, 
with the result that either all system is lost, or there is so elaborate and 
technical a system that the decision of cases turns almost entirely upon 
the working of its rules and only occasionally and incidentally upon 
the merits of the cases themselves."14 
By virtue of Sir Holdworth' s appraisal, the workability of the two intertwined atms of 
the justice system: substantial justice claims and a workably rigid procedural system, 
is attained when a proper balance is struck. The proper balance is attained when there 
is due regard as opposed to undue regard to procedural technicalities that hampers 
substantive justice. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Undue regard to procedural technicalities can lead to the adjournment of proceedings, 
expunging of pleadings off the court record, striking out applications and dismissal of 
matters altogether (collectively ' the halting of proceedings'). The element of delay 
introduced by the halting of proceedings results in temporal inefficiency that defeats 
the ends which civil justice is geared towards. Zuckerman, while adopting the 
aphorism 'justice delayed is justice denied' coined by William Gladstone, posits that a 
13He111)1JB Kendall & Others v Peter Hamilton (1878) 4 AC 504. 
14 
Holdsworth W, History of English Law, 3rd ed, Vol II, 251 . 
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decision may be unjust not because it is incorrect, but because it comes too late to put 
things right and therefore defeats the ends of civil justice. 15 
The overarching problem to be addressed in this research is the extent which undue 
regard to procedural technicalities extinguishes the overriding objectives of the Civil 
Procedure Rules. Despite the embedding of the undue regard to procedural 
technicalities clause in the Constitution, it is unclear what this guiding principle fully 
entails. 
1.4 Aim of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to determine what due regard to procedural technicalities 
is as anticipated by Article 159 of the Constitution vis-a-visundue regard to 
procedural technicalities. 
1.5 Statement of Objective(s) 
The objectives of this study are as follows: 
(a) To analyze the effect of Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution that establishes 
that administration of justice is to be done without undue regard to procedural 
technicalities; 
(b) To probe if and how courts precipitate undue regard to procedural 
technicalities in the adjudication of civil disputes; 
(c) To evaluate the effects of undue regard to procedural technicalities in the civil 
justice system; and 
(d) To recommend a test to guide the courts in determining what due regard to 
procedural technicalities is aided by practice, legal principles and case law. 
1.6 Research Question (s) 
This research will seek to answer the following questions: 
(a) What is the effect of Article 159(2)( d) of the Constitution on procedural 
justice in the civil courts? 
(b) What are the effects of undue regard to procedural technicalities on 
substantive justice? 
15Zuckerman A, ' A Reform of Civil Procedure - Rationing Procedure Rather than Access to Justice ', 
22 Journal of Law and Society, 1995, 8. 
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(c) What are the elements of due regard to procedural technicalities? 
1. 7 Hypothesis 
There is need ·for a proper delineation of what amounts to due ~egard to procedural 
technicalities. 
1.8 Research Design & Methodology 
The research design that will be used in this study will be correlational design to 
determine the correlation between two variables: the overriding objective and undue 
regard to procedural technicalities. 
The methodology adopted will be desk-based and the tools to be used will be 
secondary data and will entail analysis of case law from the commonwealth, the 
Superior courts of Kenya, the Civil Procedure Rules and procedural law texts. 
1.9 Limitations and Delimitations of the Study 
I. The ingredients of this research will be statute, case reports and my 
subsequent reflections on these. Albeit authoritative, this 'inquiry' into the 
legal principle of undue regard to procedural technicalities will not get any 
support from social facts or values and thus the recommendations may be far 
from social reality. 
II. In this research, the author will emphasize on traditional sources of law such 
as statute and judicial pronouncements. The actual practice and attitude of 
subordinate court~ and quasi-judicial tribunals, whose judgments remain 
unreported, will be left unexplored. 
III. This research does not involve a study of the extra-legal factors, interests and 
prejudices that may have directly or indirectly influenced the operation of the 
law. This may hamper the devising of appropriate legislative or policy-
oriented measures to do away with the factors that are desisting/have desisted 
the law to be effective or to minimize their adverse effects on the law' s 
performance. 
1.10 Scope and Chapter Breakdown 
This first chapter of this dissertation is introductory in scope and content. The chapter 
titled 'Introduction' presents the Background of the Problem, the Aim of the study, 
5 
Statement of Objective(s), research questions, Hypothesis, Research Design & 
Methodology, Limitations and delimitations of the Study and the chapter breakdown. 
Chapter Two titled 'Theoretical Framework and Literature Review' outlines the 
theoretical underpinnings of the study by examining the overriding objective of civil 
procedure. The chapter concludes with a comprehensive appraisal of scholars ' and 
judicial application of the overriding objective. 
Chapter Three titled 'Undue Regard to Procedural Technicalities in Action' examines 
the extent to which the Superior courts in Kenya apply the "undue regard" principle. 
The appraisal provides the foundation for Chapter Four, which consolidates the 
critical elements of the undue regard principle and presents a compelling case for 
reform. 
Chapter Four titled 'Due Regard To Procedural Technicalities Test' outlines the need 
for a predictable test by discussing the principle of Legal Certainty and proposes a test 
as to what "undue regard" may be. 
Chapter Five titled 'Conclusion & Recommendations' draws conclusions from the 
study and recommends interventions to refonn in policy and legislation for the 
reduction of undue regard to procedural technicalities by courts and tribunals in 
Kenya in the administration of civil justice. 
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CHAPTER II. THEORETICAL FRAME,VORK AND LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The preceding introductory chapter sets out the main objective of the study and 
outlines the research problem. To understand the undue regard to procedural 
technicalities, one must appreciate the appurtenant notion of the overriding objective 
of civil procedure. A principle so critical it was aptly baptized the 'Oxygen principle' 
because like oxygen, the principle has the potential to re-energize the civil system of 
justice and give the courts the freedom to attain justice in each case in a manner that 
above all takes into account the special circumstances of each case and the best way 
ofhandling it. 16 
2.2 The Overriding Objective Principle 
The overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Act and Rules is to facilitate the just, 
expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of the civil disputes govemed by 
the Act. 17Courts are mandated to seek to give effect to the overriding objective in the 
exercise of its powers under the abovementioned Act or the interpretation of any of its 
provisions. 18 That does not mark the end of obligations as parties to civil proceedings 
or an advocate for such a party is under a duty to assist the court to further the 
overriding objective of the Act and by dint of that to participate in its processes and 
comply with its directions and orders. 19 
In furtherance of the overriding objective, courts are given duties to handle all matters 
presented before it for the purpose of attaining: the just determination of the 
proceedings; the efficient disposal of the business of the court ; the efficient use of the 
available judicial and administrative resources; the timely disposal of the proceedings, 
and all other proceedings in the court, at a cost affordable by the respective patiies; 
and the use of suitable technology. 20This ove1Tiding objective not only binds the 
courts of first instance but also applies to appellate courts as discemible from the 
16Hunker Trading Company Limited v Elf Oil Kenya Limited, Civil Application No. Nai 6 of 2010. 
17 S. 1A(1), Civil Procedure Act, Cap 21, Laws of Kenya. 
18 S. lA(2),Civil Procedure Act. 
19 S. 1A(3), Civil Procedure Act. 
~0 S 1B, Civil Procedure Act. 
7 
provlSlon of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act that provides for the just, expeditious, 
proportionate and affordable resolution of appeals?1 
In the United Kingdom, the matriarch of our legal system, Zuckerman found that as 
found by Lord Woolf, the main defect of the old system (much like our present 
system) was that it allowed litigants to use as many of the court's resources as they 
desired; It tolerated litigant failure to comply with the rules, especially those 
concemmg time limits; It encouraged procedural complexity that required 
practitioners to master an ever-growing volume of case law; It tolerated wasteful 
satellite litigation on matters of procedure rather than on substance; and not least, it 
created considerable scope for running up high and unpredictable litigation costs due 
to the protraction?2 In his view, the CPR's overriding objective has been elaborated in 
order to guide the court in exercising both its case management powers and its 
traditional discretion in matters ofprocedure.23 He states that the objective of the civil 
legal process remains the same: enabling the court to determine disputes on their 
merits and thereby assisting litigants to enforce their rights.24Also, it remains the case 
that a court must strive to determine the true facts and correctly apply the law to them 
in order to achieve substantive justice. 25 
Lest it be forgotten, the Civil Procedure Rules are founded on the recognition that a 
court can adequately dispense substantive justice only under a system of rules that is 
predictable, enforceable, well adapted to its purpose and which is consistently 
respected and enforced. 26For this reason, the rules are overlaid with an overriding 
objective that establishes a procedural discipline designed to enable the court to do 
substantive justice by the use of no more than proportionate resources and within a 
reasonable time.27 
Michael Howard rewords the Overriding Objective as a principle from the civil 
procedure rules whose purpose is for the civil litigation and dispute resolution process 
~ 1 S. 3A&B, Appellate Jurisdiction Act, Cap 9, Laws of Kenya. 
~~Zuckerman A, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice, Sweet & Maxwell, 2013, 1. 
~3 Zuckerman A, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice 2. 
~4 Zuckerman A, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice 2. 
~5 Zuckerman A, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice 2. 
~6 Zuckerman A, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice2 . 
~ 7 Zuckerman A, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice 2. 
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to be fair, fast and inexpensive.28 The postulate is that each case should be treated 
proportionally in relation to size, importance and complexity of the claim and the 
financial situation of the parties and that the court must consider the oveniding 
objective when they make rulings, give directions and interpret the Civil Procedure 
Rules.29This definition concurs with the expediency and efficiency principles seen in 
the Overriding Objective in the Kenyan Civil Procedure Act.30 · 
It is also paramount to evaluate how the principle has been construed in judicial 
interpretation. In Biguzzi v Bank Leisure PLC, Lord Woolf stated that under the 
English Civil Procedure Rules, the position is fundamentally different as the first rule 
makes clear the rules constitute a new procedural code with the overriding objective 
of enabling the court to deal with cases justly.31 He went on to state that the problem 
with the position prior to the introduction of the new CPR was that often the court had 
to take harsh steps such as striking out the proceedings in claims where there had 
been a wholesale disregard of the rules amounting to an abuse of process .32 
Lord Penzance as if echoing the words of Lord Woolf posited that the spirit of justice 
does not reside in formalities, or words, nor is the triumph of its administration to be 
found in successfully picking a way between the pitfalls of technicality. After all law 
is, or ought to be, but the handmaid of justice, and inflexibility, which is the most 
becoming robe of the latter, often serves to render the former grotesque. 33 Indeed, 
undue regard to technicalities erodes the quality of procedures. 34 
In Republic v City County of Nairobi now County Government of Nairobi & another 
Ex-parte Kepha 0. Maobe & 365 others on their behalf and of all residents of 
Kimathi Estate,Justice Odunga, in adopting the precedent set in the Deepak Kamani 
case appreciated that the Court of Appeal's holding that the initial approach of the 
courts must now not be to automatically strike out a pleading but to first examine 
whether the striking out will be in conformity with the overriding objectives set out in 
~ 8Howard M, Civil Litigation and Dispute Resolution: Legal English Dictionary,Legal English Books 
Publishers, 2013 , 21. 
29Howard M, Civil Litigation and Dispute Resolution: Legal English Dictionary, 22. 
30 S. 3, Civil Procedure Act, Cap 21, Laws of Kenya. 
See also S. 1, Appellate Jurisdiction Act, Cap 9, Laws of Kenya. 
31(1999) I Weekly Law Reports 1926. 
32(1999) 
JJc ombe v Edwards (1878), The Law Reports. 
34 Laibuta I, 'Access to Civil Justice in Kenya: An Appraisal of the Policy and Legal Frameworks, 
Unpublished LLD Thesis, University ofNairobi, Nairobi, 2012,358. 
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the legislation.35 
If a way or ways alternative to striking out are available, the courts must consider 
those alternatives and see if they are in consonance with the overriding objective than 
a striking out. 36 
This Study will therefore attempt to decipher to what extent undue regard to 
procedural technicalities by courts is a breach of the overriding. objective of the CPR 
and also a breach of the court's duty to be guided by it, in exercise of their judicial 
functions. The Study will also examine whether the due to regard to procedural 
technicalities complies with the overriding objective of the CPR. 
2.3 Literature Review 
The poring over and perusing of pertinent literature to examine the extent, if any, to 
which any of the aspects of this study has been previously undertaken indicated a 
lacuna in research. Despite there being a wide range of literature that had the potential 
to inform the study with respect to the conceptual, legal and theoretical frameworks 
on which this study is grounded, little has been accomplished in the specific area of 
undue regard to procedural justice. 
The broad subject of the overriding objective has been popular among published 
theorists and jurists alike. Nevertheless, none have devoted their time and scholarship 
to the specific subject and constituent elements of undue regard to procedural 
technicalities, and even fewer to the narrower subject of undue regard to procedural 
technicalities in Kenya and thereby the necessity of this research endeavor. 
Be that as it may, as regards judicial reforms in civil justice, England and Wales 
present the most influential comparative experience for Kenya due to the adoption of 
common law system through its transplantation in the context of colonial domination 
rather than organically. 37 
Professor Jolowicz tells of the English landscape in the twentieth century as follows : 
35 (2017) eKLR . . 
See also Deepak Chamanlal Kamani & Another v Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission & 2 Others , 
Civil Appeal (Application) No. 152 of2009. 
36(20 17) 
37
Joireman S, The Evolution of the Common Law: Legal Development in Kenya and India, Political 
Sciepce Faculty Publications, 2006, 68 . 
10 
"A few grumbles can, of course, be found in the literature of the time, 
but the general euphoria that prevailed at the end of the nineteenth and 
beginning of the twentieth century can be seen in an essay by Lord 
Bowen in 1887 and a lecture by Blake Odgers QC in 1901. Lord 
Bowen was prepared to assert 'without fear of contradiction that it is 
not possible in the year 1887 for an honest litigant in her Majesty's 
Supreme Court to be defeated by any mere technicality, any slip, any 
mistaken step in his litigation', and he considered that the county court 
legislation and those who carried out its provisions in the provinces 
had furnished the population of the country ' at their very doors with 
justice, cheap, excellent, and expeditious'. Blake Odgers, while 
conceding that perfection had not yet been achieved, repeated Lord 
Bowen's sentiments in words not very different and concluded, 
"Litigation in 1800 was dilatory and costly; now it is cheap and 
expeditious." To borrow the language of Lord Brougham, the 
procedure of our courts was in 1800 "a two-edged sword in the hands 
of craft and oppression; it is now the staff of honesty and the shield of 
innocence. "38 
The esteemed professor reminds us that the question of setback of matters in comi due 
to technicalities and the hope for inexpensive, excellent and expeditious justice is no 
novelty. 
Genn asks "Why procedural rules are so important and answers that the rules 
guarantee procedural fairness, and procedural fairness is important both in its own 
right and through its link with substantive justice."39 She goes on to acknowledge the 
challenge facing any civil justice system today is where to find the balance between 
efficiency and substantive justice.40 The question then becomes, how much procedural 
justice is needed to achieve an appropriate degree of substantive justice. 41 The 
challenge, then, is to find the balance between procedures that are seen as fair, that 
contribute to substantive justice and that provide reasonable access to justice so that 
rights can be enforced, but are not so complicated or expensive as to make 
38 Jolowicz J, On Civil Procedure, Cambridge University Press, 2000, 356. 
39 Genn H, Judging Civil Justice , Cambridge University Press, 2008 , 13. 
40 Genn H, Judging Civil Justice, 15. 
41 Genn H, Judging Civil Justice, 15 . 
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proceedings inaccessible.42 She therefore establishes the thin line that courts ought to 
distinguish in the balance of substantive and procedural justice; this involves the 
tactful regard of procedural technicalities such that neither procedural nor substantive 
justice will be harmed in that process or by the outcome(s).43 
Zuckerman has argued that measuring the success of procedures_ in doing justice is a 
complex judgment relating to rectitude of decision, time and cost. He states that there 
is no perfect rectitude of decision, justice cannot be dispensed instantly without some 
delay, and justice cannot be absolutely free of cost constraints. Each system has had to 
balance the competing demands and strike a compromise.44 Therefore, the question of 
undue regard to procedural technicalities falls squarely within the perimeters of 
success of procedures in justice since it has negative implications as to time due to its 
effect ofhalting of proceedings and its requisite delays. 
Sir Jack Jacob while lauding the supremacy of procedure states that the essential 
function of procedure is to infuse life into all other areas of the law, to bring into 
actual being and to give reality and effect to all the legal rights and duties of every 
person and body in society. 45 He also accedes to Bentham's characterization of 
procedural law as adjective law as compared to substantive law thereby stressing that 
the object and end of the code of procedural law is to give execution and effect to the 
rules of substantive law.46 In essence, Sir Jack Jacob posits that procedure has been 
described as the servant not the master of justice, so that its rules should not compel 
any court to do what will cause injustice in any particular case.47 Veritably, the undue 
regard to procedural technicalities is a voluntary act of the court to be subdued by 
rules which constitutes a perversion of the function of procedure. 
In assessing the overriding objectives of CPR, Prof. Zuckerman states that the 
strength of the CPR lies precisely in confronting the inevitable tension between three 
4
" Genn H, Judging Civil Justice, 15. 
43Genn H, Judging Civil Justice, 15. 
44 
Zuckerman A, Civil Justice in Crisis: Comparative Persp ectives of Civil Procedure, Oxfo rd 
University Press, 1999, 11. 
45
Jacob J, The Fabric of English Civil Justice, Hamlyn Lecture Series 38(1987)63 . 
46 Sir Jacob J, The Fabric of English Civil Justice, 64. 
47 Sir Jacob J, The Fabric of English Civil Justice, 64. 
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imperatives: the need for correct outcomes, the need for expeditious resolution, and 
the practical constraints of court and party resources. 48 
The now defunct Judges and Magistrates Vetting Board in its publication of the 
Fourth A1mouncement Determinations on Suitability and on Requests For Review 
conceded that sad Kenyan experience indicates why the undue regard principle was 
granted constitutional value by stating that: 
"The raising of technical and procedural questions was a particularly 
strong weapon in the armory of those who sought to defend the 
powerful and the wealthy with the cmmivance of compliant judges. 
Substantive questions could be evaded and matters left to drift in the 
courts for so long that outcomes became irrelevant. Reliance on ultra-
technicality was used to impede the work of agencies set up to 
investigate malfeasance by those in positions of authority. Far from 
furthering the rule of law, these narrow, technical rulings, issued in the 
name of legality, contributed massively to the prevalence of impunity. 
Indeed, they undennined the rule of law, promoting a spirit of 
lawlessness that proceeded from the highest in the land all the way 
down. The unhappy lesson for the country was that the emancipatory 
vision of the rule of law should not be confused with the tyranny of 
heartless legalism. "49 
Hon. Lady Justice Byamugisha of the Court of Appeal of Uganda is also of the view 
that rules of procedure are supposed to help the courts expedite court business but are 
not supposed to be ironclad obstacles to all causes of action in all circumstances. 5° In 
her article she pegged her assertion on the case of Kasirye Byaruhanga &Co 
Advocates v Uganda Development Bank that came before the Court of Appeal of 
Uganda on an application for enlargement of time. 51 In rejecting the application, the 
Court considered Art 126(2)( e) of the Constitution of Uganda that mirrors A1iicle 
159(2)( d) of the Kenyan Constitution and stated that: 
48 
Zuckerman A, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure: Principles of Practice, Sweet & Maxwell, 16. 
4\2012) eKLR. 
50 Administering Justice Without Undue Regard to the Technicalities , 2003, 3. 
Cited by Justice Ngenye-Macharia in Office of the Direcior of Public Prosecutions v Sylvester Mogel a 
& another (20 17) eKLR. 
51 Civil Application No.2 of97. 
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"A litigant who relies on the provisions of Article 126(2)(e) must 
satisfy the court that in the circumstances of the particular case before 
the court it was not desirable to pay undue regard to a relevant 
technicality. Article 126(2)( e) is not a magic wand in the hands of 
defaulting litigants."52 
The honorable judge goes on to state that: 
"The right to be heard should always be a relevant consideration and 
therefore should be considered before such applications are rejected on 
technical grounds. In some instances there may be no injustices that 
would be caused to the opposite party. In any case, our judicial system 
should never permit a party to be driven from the judgment seat 
without the court considering his/her/its/ right to be heard except in 
cases where the cause of action is obviously and almost incontestably 
bad."53 
2.4 Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter of the broad concept of overriding objective in the 
context of civil justice outlines the essence of restraining procedure to its proper 
office and intended objectives. This chapter provides a sound theoretical background 
for Chapter three, which examines the historical development and the current status of 
the legal framework and the case law application of the overriding objective and the 
undue regard principle. 
5"(1995) 
53Byamugisha, Administering Justice Without Undue Regard to the Technicalities, 4. 
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CHAPTER III: UNDUE REGARD TO PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITIES IN 
ACTION 
3.1 Introduction 
The undue regard principle is no novelty in Kenya. Before the promulgation of the 
Constitution of Kenya on 2ih August 2010, S. 3(2) of the Judicature Act provided 
that the courts were to be guided by African customary law in civil cases in which one 
or more of the parties is subject to it or affected by it, so far as it is applicable and is 
not repugnant to justice and morality or inconsistent with any written law, and all 
such cases were to be decided according to substantial justice without undue regard to 
technicalities of procedure and without undue delay. 54 
Inasmuch as the principle existed, courts were only directed to apply it in applying 
African customary law. Courts however numerously pronounced themselves on the 
same. As a result, two schools of thought that I label the "stem" and the "permissive" 
schools of thought emerged from the bench. The fonner is evinced in how in the past 
the courts were castigated for undue regard to procedural technicalities in 
discontinuing matters before them. 55 
3.3 Ante-2010 Jurisprudence 
Conforming to the stare decisis principle, an abbreviation of the Latin phrase stare 
decisis et non qiueta movere which translates to 'stand by decided matters and not to 
disturb settled matters', decisions of a higher court within the same jurisdiction acts as 
binding authority on a lower court within that same jurisdiction56.It is thus prudent to 
begin by appraising the decisions of the court of Appeal before those of those of the 
High Court. 57 
The Court of Appeal was infamous for being painfully resolute in their interpretation 
of, inter alia, rule 85 of the repealed Court of Appeal Rules with the result that 
Appeals continued to succumb to the already overflowing graveyard of struck-out 
appeals. 58 Plior to the embedding of the Overriding objective in the Appellate 
Jurisdiction Act, inPepco v Carter, a party named 'Pepco Construction Company 
54 Cap 8, Laws ofKenya. 
55 Kanjama C, Rule 85 of the Court of Appeal Rules, Hot From the Bench, 
http://www .lawafrica.co.ke/bench.php?hbid=7 on 28 August 2017. 
56Gall G, The Canadian Legal System , Carswell Legal Publications, 1983, 220. 
57 Chapter 10, Constitution of Kenya (20 1 0) 





Limited' was mistakenly drawn in the Notice of Appeal as 'Pepco Construction & 
Transport Co Ltd', the name initially used in the case file. 59 Further, the title of the 
notice of appeal erroneously included the word 'Intended' .60 In dismissing the matter, 
the court held that these defects were incurable. 61 
In R v KPTC the court held, suo motu, that a correctly dated order mistakenly 
attributed to Justice Khamoni instead of Justice Githinji was incurable by 
amendment. 62 Section 1 00 of the Civil Procedure Act conferred on the court general 
power to amend any defect in proceedings whereas section 3(2) of the Appellate 
Jurisdiction Act vests in the Court of Appeal the power of the High Court.63 In spite 
of that, the court was not willing to allow these legislative provisions to stand on two 
feet in any way or defeat an amendment to Rule 85(2A) of the Rules, which subsists 
as delegated legislation.64 To add insult to injury, Rule 1(2) bestowing inherent power 
on the court and Rule 44 granting it general power to amend was not allowed to 
subtract even a whit from the full force of Rule 85(2A).65It has been argued that the 
ratio was blunt: "Every rule, particularly one brought in by way of amendment, must 
be given effect. "66This indisposition is seen in the Order granted in the case that 
neither set out particulars of the claim or relief sought nor properly described the 
parties. As was argued by Kanjama who I wholly concur with, the message was loud 
and clear: the Court of Appeal would not suffer any but the slightest deviation from 
procedure, and "shall" in the rules would be construed as "must".67 
The courts were not however all rigid pre-201 0, in Kenya Commercial Bank Limited v 
Kenya Planters Co-operative Union, Justice Nyamu (Judge of Appeal) in allowing an 
application to be filed out of time stated that allowing a delay of one day cannot by 
any standard be said to be inordinate and the two reasons given for the delay namely 
the need to undo the record so as to again bind it in acceptable colours and the 
59Pepco Construction Company Limited v Carter & Sons Limited (2000) eKLR. 
60Pepco Construction Company Limited v Carter & Sons Limited. 
6 1Pepco Construction Company Limited v Carter & Sons Limited. 
62R v KPTC (1999) (CAK) LLR 901 
63Kanjama C, Rule 85 of the Court of Appeal Rules. 
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• Kanjama C, Rule 85 of the Court of Appeal Rules. 
65 Kanjama C, Rule 85 of the Court of Appeal Rules. 
66 Kanjama C, Rule 85 of the Court of Appeal Rules. 
67 Kanjarna C, Rule 85 of the Court of Appeal Rules. 
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intervening Easter holiday which delayed the taking of instructions cannot be said to 
be a frivolous reason and the two reasons were acceptable to the court.68 
In the same lenient spirit, Justice Hancox in Githere v Kimungu, postulated that: 
"The relation of rules of practice to the administration of justice is 
intended to be that of a handmaiden rather than a mistress and that the 
court should not be too far bound and tied by the rules, which are 
intended as general rules of procedure, as to be compelled to do that 
which will cause injustice in a particular case."69 
These two findings as judicious as they were, were the exception rather than the norm 
and would be the inception of the reform that resulted in the installation of the undue 
regard to technicalities principle in the Constitution. 
3.3Post-201 0 Jurisprudence 
In National Bank of Kenya Limited v Ana} Warehousing Limited, theSupreme Court in 
detennining that no instrument or document of conveyance becomes invalid under 
Section 34(1 )(a) of the Advocates Act, only by dint of its having been prepared by an 
advocate who at the time was not holding a current practising certificate premised 
their decision on the undue regard to procedural technicalities. They had the following 
to say: 
"The Court's obligation coincides with the constitutional guarantee of 
access to justice (Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 48), and in that 
regard, requires the fulfillment of the contractual intention of the 
parties. It is clear to us that the parties had intended to enter into a 
binding agreement, pursuant to which money was lent and borrowed, 
on the security of a charge instrument. It cannot be tight in law, to 
defeat that clear intention, merely on the technical consideration that 
the advocate who drew the formal document lacked a current 
practising certificate. The guiding principle is to be found in Article 
159(2)( d) of the Constitution: "justice shall be administered without 
undue regard to procedural technicalities". 70 
68 (20 1 0) eKLR. 
69 1976-1985 EA 101. 
70 (20 15) eKLR. 
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The Supreme Court in essence held that such invalidation of a document of 
conveyance only by the ground would be an undue regard to procedural technicalities 
as compared to documents prepared by other categories of unqualified persons, such 
as non-advocates, or advocates whose names have been struck off the roll of 
advocates that are to be deemed void for all purposes. 71 It is to b~ read that the latter is 
what appeared to be due regard to procedural technicalities in the court's mind. 
In Raila Odinga & 5 others v IEBC and 3 others, the Supreme Court in striking out an 
affidavit, which was filed out of time as stipulated in the Supreme Court Rules and 
without, leave of the court held that Article 159(2)( d) of the Constitution did not mean 
that procedural technicalities imposed by the law may be ignored. 72 The court went on 
to posit that: 
"The essence of that provision is that a Court of law should not allow 
the prescriptions of procedure and form to trump the primary object, of 
dispensing substantive justice to the parties. This principle of merit, 
however, in our opinion, bears no meaning cast-in-stone and which 
suits all situations of dispute resolution. On the contrary, the Court as 
an agency of the processes of justice is called upon to appreciate all the 
relevant circumstances and the requirements of a particular case, and 
conscientiously determine the best course. The timelines for the 
lodgment of evidence, in a case such as this, the scheme of which is 
well laid-out in the Constitution, were in our view, most material to the 
opportunity to accord the parties a fair hearing, and to dispose of the 
grievances in a judicial manner."73 
In my opinion, inasmuch as the undue regard principle bears no concise definition, it 
was the onus of the court to interpret the law and decipher its implications. Fmiher, 
Article 159(2)( d) in its wording does not allude in any way to a case-by-case 
application of the principle but termed it as a guiding principle. By definition, a 
guiding principle is one that governs an organization throughout its life in all 





management. 74 As so, a guiding principle is a mandatory guideline as compared to an 
ad hoc policy that would other wise signify a solution designed for a specific problem 
or task, non-generalizable, and not intended to be able to be adapted to other 
purposes. 75 The court thus erred in its conceptualization of the undue regard principle 
and the consequent disallowing of evidence. 
Further, in Zacharia Okoth Obado v Edward Akong 'o Oyugi & 2 others, the Supreme 
Court held that it has had occasion to remind litigants that Article 159(2)( d) of the 
Constitution is not a panacea for all procedural shortfalls. 76 It further stated that, all 
that the Courts are obliged to do is to be guided by the undue regard to technicalities 
principle and that it was plain to the court that Article 159(2)(d) is applicable on a 
case-by-case basis. 77 A position challenged in the preceding paragraph. 
In an atypical step, Supreme Court Justice Ibrahim in the Dissenting opinion in Jasbir 
Singh Rai & 3 others v Tarlochan Singh Rai Estate of & 4 others made an intriguing 
conceptualization of procedural technicalities. 78In opining that the procedure towards 
the declaration of Section 14 of the Supreme Court Act to be unconstitutional is a 
substantive procedure that goes to the core of the constitutionality of a legislative 
activity, he posited that an issue touching on a procedure challenging the 
constitutionality of statutory law is not a matter of procedural technicality but is a 
matter of procedural substance. 79 However, in disagreeing with the honorable judge, 
all matters of procedure are normally not matters ending in themselves but are matters 
whose adjudication would have bearing on a substantive matter before the court. 
Therefore, the procedural substance categorization, albeit ingenious, is a superfluous 
one. 
In Board of Trustees of National Social Security Fund & 6 others v Meshack Owino, 
the Court of Appeal in an application to strike out a Notice of Appeal for being filed 
out of the prescribed time stated: 
74Guiding Principles, The Law Dictionary, https: //thelawdictionary.org/guiding-principles/ on 
16 January 2018 . 
75 Ad hoc, Legal Dictionary https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.corn/ad+hoc on 16 
January 2018 . 
76(2014) eKLR. 
77(2014) 
78 (20 13) eKLR. 
79(2013) 
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"By article 159(2)(d) of the new Constitution of Kenya, the courts are 
now required to administer justice without undue regard to procedural 
technicalities. In addition, this Court is required to give effect to the 
overriding objective of civil litigation enshrined in the Appellate 
Jurisdiction Act which is, among other things, to facilitate the just and 
expeditious resolution of appeals. Thus, it would be against the policy 
of the law to strike out the appeal on a mere technicality raised in 
support of the application. "80 
In Deepak Chamanla Kamani and Another versus Kenya Anti-Corruption 
Commission and 3 Others, the court of appeal concurred with Lord Woolfs position 
in the Biguzzi case that: 
The initial approach of the Courts now must not be to automatically 
strike out a pleading but to first examine whether the striking out will 
be in conformity with the overriding objective set out in the legislation. 
If a way or ways alternative to a striking out are available, the Courts 
must consider those alternatives and see if they are more consonant 
with the overriding objectives than a striking out."81 
Again, while drawing inspiration from its own decision in City Chemist (NRB) and 
Others v Oriental Commercial Bank Limited, the court made the following 
annotations: 
"The new thinking totally uproots well-established principles or 
precedent on the exercise of the discretion of the court, which is a 
judicial process devoid of whim and caprice. On the contrary the 
amendment enriches those principles and emboldens the Court to be 
guided by a broad sense of justice and fairness as it applies the 
principles. The application of clear and unambiguous principles and 
precedents assist litigants and legal practitioners alike in determining 
with some measures of certainty the validity of the claims long before 
8~airobi CA (Application), No.87 of2007 
See also Kensilver Express Limited & j 37 others v Commissioner Insurance & 4 others (2014) eKLR 
See also Hemy Njai v. Taita Ranching Co. Ltd, MSA Civil Application No.255 of2010. 
81(2010) eKLR. 
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they are instituted in court. It also guides the lower courts and 
maintains stability on the law and its application."82 
The High court has also on numerous occasions pronounced itself of procedural 
technicalities. In a restatement of the Githere case, the learned Justice Odunga 
inElgeyo Marakwet Civil Society Organization Network v Ministry of Education, 
Science And Technology & 2 others, held that: 
In human rights cases, public interest litigation matters and lawsuits 
challenging the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament, the 
procedural trappings and restrictions, the preconditions of being an 
aggrieved person and other similar technical objections, cannot bar the 
jurisdiction of the court or let justice bleed at the altar of technicality. 83 
He went on to state that the court had vast powers to do justice without technical 
restrictions and restraints; and procedures and reliefs have to be molded according to 
the facts and circumstances of each case and each situation.84 To that effect, narrow 
pure legalism for the sake of legalism will not do and that technicality cannot be 
upheld only to allow a clandestine activity through the net of judicial vigilance in the 
garb of legality. 85 
Justice Thande in the probate matter of INK v GGK & another disagreed with the 
Applicant's contention the court should do justice in total disregard to technicalities.86 
She went on to state that this was certainly not the intention of Article 159(2)(d) of the 
Constitution and that the Article does not do away with procedural technicalities but 
only reproves paying undue regard to procedural technicalities. 87 
In James Muriithi Ngotho & 4 others v Judicial Sen,ice Commission, Justice Githuain 
finding that the 6 months limitation period prescribed under Section 9(3) of the Law 
Reform Act is not a procedural technicality stated that Article 159(2)( d) did not come 
to overthrow the provisions of the law as it stands in the stature but was meant to 
82Nai Civil Application No. 302 of 2008 . 
See also Housing Finance Company of Kenya v Rose Wangari Ndegwa R. Mombasa, Court of Appeal 
Application83 of 2008. 
83(2016) eKLR. 
84(2016) eKLR. 




avoid injustices to parties arising from failure to comply with minor procedural lapses 
or technicalities in the course of proceedings. 88 A Minor procedural lapse being one 
that is condonable if its substantial requirement is complied with. 89 
3.4 Conclusion 
The review in this chapter of the Pre and Post 2010 jmisprudence on the undue regard 
principle reveals the wide gap seen in the amorphous application of the principle, as 
there is no clear policy. This chapter demonstrates that the mere embedding of the 
undue regard principle without clear guidelines does not ensure its application and 
guarantee civil justice. The following chapter explores and recommends a guideline 
that seeks to establish the undue regard to procedural technicalities test. 
88(2012) eKLR 
89 Govindarajan M, Procedural Lapse, 2015 
https://www .taxmanagementindia.corn/visitor/detail article.asp? ArticleiD=63 79on 22 November 2017. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DUE REGARD TO PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITIES 
TEST 
4.1 Introduction 
In spite of the embedding of the undue regard to procedural technicalities clause in the 
Constitution, it is unclear what this guiding principle fully entails as there exists no 
rules nor judicial pronouncements on what due vis-a-vis undue application would be 
and the modalities of application it commands. The findings in chapter three 
confirmed the inaptness of the undue regard principle as undefined and undelineated 
yields an amorphous application of the principle as compared to a uniform test that 
would give parties greater certainty as to their potential rights and obligations. 
As a result, there is need for a proper delineation of what amounts to due regard to 
procedural technicalities in a bid to prevent courts from engaging in an uncontrolled 
practice of ascertaining what undue regard to procedural technicalities is. This chapter 
proposes a legal mechanism in the form of a test to address this lacuna. 
4.2 The Principle of Legal Certainty 
The need for a definite legal test is underwritten by the principle of Legal Certainty. 
The principle stipulates that law must be precise, predictable and calculable by those 
subject to it.90 Also known as maximum predictability of an administration's behavior, 
legal certainty postulates that citizens must be protected against a threat that comes 
just from the law, against an insecurity created by law or which the law risks to 
create. 91 It requires that there be no doubt about the law applicable at a given time in a 
given area and, consequently, as to the lawful or unlawful nature of certain acts or 
conduct. 92 A more elaborate definition states that community rules enable those 
concerned to know precisely the extent of the obligations that are imposed on them; 
individuals must be able to ascertain unequivocally what their rights and obligations 
are and take steps accordingly. 93 
90 Raitio, J, The Principle Of Legal Certainty In EC Law, Springer, 2003, 16 
9 1 Predescu I & Safta M, The Principle of Legal Certainty, Basis For The Rule of Law Landmark Case-
Law, 7. 
9~The Queen v The Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Fedesa and Others, ECtHR 
Judgement of 13 November 1990, para. 8. 
93Reference for a preliminary ruling: Unabhangiger Verwaltungssenat im Land Niederosten-eich-
Austria, Judgment of the Court of Justice, ICJ Reports 2009, 44. 
23 
Two requirements of the Legal Certainty stand out for emphasis: accessibility and 
foresee ability of the law and assurance of the unitary interpretation of the law. The 
fanner posits that in order for an existing law to have legal effect, its recipients must 
know effects of the law bringing it to public attention and after its entry into force. 94 
The fanner's essence is espoused by the European Court of Human Rights' holding in 
Paduraru v Romania that: 
"The absence of a mechanism which ensures consistency in the 
practice of the national courts, such profound and long-standing 
differences in approach in the case-law, concerning a matter of 
considerable importance to society, are such as to create continual 
unceriainty and to reduce the public's confidence in the judicial system, 
which is one of the essential components of a State based on the rule of 
law."95 
As noted by the Victorian Law Refonn Commission, inconsistency and 
unpredictability in the civil justice system are highly undesirable for a variety of 
obvious reasons and that conduct in the community generally, by individuals, entities 
and governments, is regulated according to perceptions of the applicable law and 
predictions about the likely outcome oflitigation.96 
Accordingly, the legal certainty principle goes to bat for a uniform test in a bid to 
avoid inconsistent interpretation that frustrates the goal of uniformity in the law. In 
the words of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, legal certainty is essential for 
the rule of law and law cannot 'rule' unless it is reasonably predictable.97 In view of 
the foregoing, a unifonn legal test of what constitutes undue regard to procedural 
technicalities is of quintessential import. 
4.3Undue regard to Procedural Technicalities Test 
4.3.1 Overriding Objective Contravention 
The starting post in actuating undue regard to procedural technicalities is the very 
object on which civil procedure was tailored for. Needless to say, the object of a 
94 Predescu I & Safta M, The Principle of Legal Certainty, 2009, 7. 
9" 
'ECtHR Judgment of 1 Dec 2005, para 794. 
96Victorian Law Reform Commission, Civil Justice Review: Report 14 (2008), 94. 
97 Gcaba v Ministerfor Safety and Security, (20 1 0) South Africa Constitutional Court. 
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statute is its aim or purpose; the end or design that it is meant to accomplish.98 The 
object of procedural technicalities is laid out by the overriding objective of the civil 
procedure rules. As laid out earlier in Chapter two, the overriding objective of the 
CPR is to facilitate the just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of the 
civil disputes. 
The object of the Civil Procedure Rules is the provenance of the test given that it 
portrays a clear and .unambiguous legislative intent. An application of civil procedure 
rules in a manner that violates the overriding objective principle amounts to 
procedural abuse, the very mischief that the principle was enacted to remedy. 99 It then 
becomes pressing to appraise the four elements of the overriding objective against 
regard to procedural technicalities. 
The first element of the just resolution of civil disputes entails their just disposition. 
The English Civil Procedure Rules used by the English Court of Appeal, High Court 
of Justice and County Courts in civil cases in England and Wales after which the 
Kenyan overriding objective is modeled after, defines dealing with a case justly to 
include so far as is practicable: ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing; 
saving expense; ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly; allotting to it an 
appropriate share of the court's resources, while taking into account the need to allot 
resources to other cases; enforcing compliance with rules, practice directions and 
orders; dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate - to the amount of 
money involved; to the importance of the case; to the complexity of the issues; and to 
the financial position of each party. Undue regard to procedural technicalities violates · 
the just disposition requirement as it increases expense by driving up Advocate 
litigation costs; defeats expediency by imposing a delay to the detennination of the 
dispute, allots a superfluous share of the courts resources at the expense of future 
cases; and enforces a rigid compliance rules, practice directions and orders. 
In addition to the definition of proportionality given in the foregoing paragraph, the 
element of proportionality takes on varying meanings including the following namely, 
proportionality as requiring: 
98 Bjacks Law Dictionary, 81" ed. 
99Heydon's Case (1584) EWHC Exch J36, 76 ER 637. 
25 
a) Litigation costs to bear a reasonably proportionate relationship with the 
amount at stake in the dispute; 
b) Procedures to be appropriately matched to the case, that is, ensunng that 
elaborate procedures (which may be appropriate for big and complex cases) 
are not used unnecessarily in ordinary cases; 
c) Applications for drastic forms of relief, such as Anton Piller orders or orders 
for committal for contempt, to be avoided where such relief would be 
disproportionate in the circumstances; 
d) Procedural sanctions and orders to be issued in a manner proportionate to the 
requirements of procedural and substantive justice, for instance, not sttiking 
out the entire claim when a lesser sanction would suffice, and not ordering 
extensive particulars or further discovery where the benefits are likely to be 
slight and would not justify the expense and effort involved; 
e) Cases to be instituted in the correct tribunal, avoiding the High Court where 
the simpler procedures of a lower court or tribunal would suffice; and 
f) Procedural orders to be made which are proportionate to the financial position 
of each party. 100 
Undue regard to technicalities breaches the proportionality requirement of the 
overriding objective in copious ways: It increases litigation costs, which cumulatively 
lessen the fruits oflitigation to be enjoyed from the initial amount at stake in the 
dispute; Calls for drastic fonns of relief even though such relief would be 
disproportionate m the circumstances; invites procedural sanctions which are 
disproportionate to the requirements of procedural and substantive justice like 
dismissal even when a lesser corrective sanction would suffice. 
The next element, expediency, entails the expeditious disposal of matters before the 
court. It is defined to mean that, in any proceedings, the practice and procedure of the 
court should be implemented with the object of eliminating any lapse of time between 
the commencement of the proceedings and their final determination beyond that 
reasonably required for the interlocutory activities necessary for the fair and just 
determination of the issues in dispute between the parties and the preparation of the 
10°Civil Justice Reform,Final Report of the Chief Justice's Working Party On Civil Justice Reform, 
2003 , 56 Http://Www.Legco.Gov.HkNr06-07/English/Bc/Bc57/Papers/Bc5706llcb2-1960-E.Pdf On 
23 December 20 17. 
26 
case for trial. 101 At the hand of that, undue regard to procedural technicalities violates 
the expediency requirement by increasing the lapse of time between the 
commencement of the proceedings and their final determination by entertaining 
superfluous applications, adjournments and delays. 
Finally, the affordability proviso is closely tied to the proportionality in cost clause 
and provides that the cost of litigation ought to be more affordable, more predictable, 
and more proportionate to the value and complexity of individual cases. 102 
Accordingly, undue regard to procedural technicalities violates the affordability 
requirement by increasing the cost of litigation such that it becomes expensive, 
unpredictable and disproportionate to the value and complexity of individual cases. 
4.3.2 Obstruction and Extinguishing of Legal Rights 
The second tine of the "undue regard" principle is spurred by the holding of Lord 
Penzancethat: 
"Procedure strangely departs from its proper office when, in place of 
facilitating, it is permitted to obstruct, and even extinguish, legal rights, 
and is thus made to govern where it ought to sub 
serve. 103 
This implores an examination of what legal rights are up for such obstruction or 
extinguishing. The principal legal right at issue is the right to a fair trial that is 
extended to civil proceedings by attracting equal treatment of all persons before courts 
and tribunals in the determination of their rights and obligations in a suit at law. 104 A 
fair trial obligates expedition, proportionality and fairness of process. 105 As a result, 
the applicant must have a real opportunity to present his or her case or challenge the 
101 The Law Society of New South Wales, Civil Procedure Themes and Case Management, 
https :/ /nex usnotes-media. s3 -ap-southeast-2. amazona ws. com/wp-content/up I oads/ edd/20 15/03 /C i vi I-
Procedure-Law170315-copyl.pdfon 20 December 2017. 
10~Todd M, Doerries C, Fancourt T, Moriarty S, Bowdery M & Clark G, Reforming Civil Litigation , 
Recommendations by the Bar Council of England and Wales , (2016) 7. 
103 H~my JB Kendall & Others v Peter Hamilton (1878) 4 Appeal Cases 504. 
104 Art 14, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNGA 171. 
105 Imaana L, Access to Civil Justice in Kenya: An Apprisal of the Policy and Legal Frameworks, 24. 
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case against them requiring procedural equality. 106For the Victorian Law Reform 
Commission, fairness is a fundamental requirement of civil justice 
;civil justice requires not only 'fair' results but also outcomes arrived at by fair 
procedures. 107 Further, as Justice Gaudron observed (albeit in the context of the 
criminal trial), 'The requirement of fairness is not only independent, it is intrinsic and 
inherent. ' 108 
The right to access justice 
follows for consideration. Access to justice is much more than improving an 
individual's access to courts, or guaranteeing legal representation. 109 It is rightly 
defined in terms of ensuring that legal and judicial outcomes are just and equitable. 110 
It may be understood as to include the ability to realize the right to full and equal 
access to protection of one's entitlements by the law enforcement agencies without 
undue delay, expense or technicalities. This presupposes less resource intensive pre-
trial protocols and civil process of claim adjudication. 
Tied to the right to access justice is the related principle of equity and 
efficiency. 111 Pursuant to this principle, the civil justice system has critical goals of 
timeliness; 112ensuring a case is dealt with as expeditiously as is reasonably practicable 
and that the resources of the court are distributed fairly; 113and cases are dealt with 
reasonable speed. 114 
In addition to the right to a fair trial and access to justice, there are other legal tights 
affected by undue regard to procedural technicalities. These are the rights claimed in 
11MLiberty, Article 6 Right to a fair trial, 
https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uklhuman-rights/what-are-human-rights/human-rights-
act/article-6-right-fair-trial on 21 December 2017. 
107 Australian Law Reform Commission, Framework for 
https :/ /www .a! rc .gov .au/pub I ications/2-framework-reform/principles-reform# ftn77 on 21 
2017. 
108Victorian Law Reform Commission, Civil Justice Review, Report 14 (2008), 94. 
Reform, 
December 
109 Unt'ted States Instt'tut.. of P u C d' · A t ! t. " eace, 1vecessmy on znon: ccess o . us zce, 
https :/ /www. usi p. org/ guiding-pri nc i pI es-sta bi I i za ti on-and-reconstruction-the-web-versi onlrul e-
law/access-justice on 22 Dec 2017 . 
110United Nations Development Programme, Access to Justice (2004) 6. 
111 Imaana L, Access to Civil Justice in Kenya: An Apprisal of the Policy and Legal Frameworks, 24. 
11 ~Victorian Law Reform Commission, Civil Justice Review, Report 14 (2008), 92. 
113 Chief Justice ' s Working Party on Civil Justice Reform (Hong Kong), Civil Justice Reform: An 
Overview-Judicimy , 2009, 2. 
11 4Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report, 1996, 1. 
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the substance of the causes of action before a court or tribunal. Justice Nyamweya 
shrewdly canvassed this question in Dupoto Group Limited v Kenya Airports 
Authority & Another 
where he held that the overriding principle to be considered in an application for 
striking out of a pleading is whether it raises any triable issues. This is because a 
pleading that raises triable issues confirms the existence of a reasonable cause of 
action that merits a hearing. 115 Examples of such rights claimed in the determination 
of civil rights and obligations are inter alia: property rights, the right to practice a 
profession, family rights, the right to compensation, the right to engage in commercial 
activities, some employment decisions, control orders and anti-social behaviour 
orders etc. 116 
Salmon LJ in Nagle V Fieldencited by the court of Appeal in D. T. Dobie & Company 
(Kenya) Limited v Joseph lY!baria Muchina & anotherheld that it is trite law that a 
statement of claim should not be struck out and the plaintiff driven from the judgment 
seat unless the case is unlitgable. 117 Accordingly, it is necessary to consider whether 
or not this plaintiff has an arguable case. 
In Microsoft Corporation v Mitsumi Garage Ltd & Another, it was appreciated that: 
"Rules of procedure are the handmaids and not the mistresses of justice 
and should not be elevated to a fetish since theirs is to facilitate the 
administration of justice in a fair, orderly and predictable manner, not 
to fetter or choke it and where it is evident that the plaintiff has 
attempted to comply with the rule requiring verification of a plaint but 
has fallen short of the prescribed standards, it would be to elevate form 
and procedure to fetish to strike out the suit. Deviations from, or lapses 
in form and procedure, which do not go to jurisdiction of the court or 
prejudice the adverse party in any fundamental respect ought not to be 
treated as nullifying the legal instruments thus affected. In those 
11 \2013) eKLR. 
116Liberty, Article 6 Right to a fair trial, 
https:/ /www. I i berty-human-ri ghts.org. uk/human-rights/what-are-human-rights/human-rights-
act/article-6-right-fair-trial on 21 December 2017. 
11 \1966) 2 Queens Bench Division 651; ( 1980) eKLR. 
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instances the court should rise to its calling to do justice by saving the 
proceedings in issue." 118 
The Court of Appeal in Stephen Bora Gitiha v Family Finance Building Society & 3 
others held that the overriding objective overshadows all technicalities, precedents, 
rules and actions which are in conflict with it, and whatever is in conflict with it must 
give way. Further, if the often talked of backlog of cases_ is littered with similar 
matters, the challenge to the courts is to use the new "broom" of overriding objective 
to bring cases to finality, by declining to hear unnecessary interlocutory applications 
and instead to adjudicate on the principal issues in a full hearing if possible. 119Lord 
WoolfC.J in Jones v University of Warwick as ifto echo the Kenyan Court of Appeal 
held that a judge's responsibility today, in the course of properly managing litigation 
requires him when exercising his discretion in accordance with the oveniding 
objective to consider the effect of his decision upon litigation broadly. He further 
stated that proactive management of civil proceedings, which is at the heart of the 
CPR, is not only concerned with an individual piece of litigation that is before the 
Court, it is also concerned with litigation as a whole. 120 The undue regard to 
technicalities in one case fails to consider the effect of that decision upon litigation 
generally by dint of the doctrine of precedence that will bind other courts to follow 
the errant precedent. 
Accordingly, undue regard to procedural technicalities occurs when in place of 
facilitating, it is permitted to obstruct and even extinguish legal rights by denying the 
applicant a real opportunity to present his or her case despite it raising triable issues. 
4.3.3 Procedural Justice 
The final precinct of the larger undue regard to procedural technicalities test is 
informed by the notion of procedural justice. A procedurally just system is defined as 
one that must strike the appropriate balance among three potentially competing ends: 
accuracy, cost, and meaningful participation rights in order to foster substantive 
equality within civillitigation. 121 
118Nairobi HCCC No. 810 of2001 ;(2001) 2 EA 460. 
11 9 (2009) eK.LR. 
PO - (2003) I Wales Law Reports 954. 
121 Stancil P, ' Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice ', I 02( 4) Iowa Law Review, 2017, 1633 . 
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In his Southern California Law Review procedural justice appraisal, Solum defines 
three competing ends in his postulation that a procedural regime is only just when it 
strikes the appropriate balance between accurate application of law to facts, cost 
minimization, and meaningful participation rights. 122 
To begin with, the Cost of Adjudication Principle provides that the systemic costs of 
adjudication are not excessive in relation to the interests at stake in the proceeding or 
type of proceeding as to exceed its benefits. 123 
Under the Participation Principle, the arrangements for the resolution of civil disputes 
should be structured to provide each interested party with a right to meaningful 
participation, as specified by the following conditions and provisos: 
(a) The Interest Condition that the right to participation should extend to all 
persons who will be the subject of final binding adjudication and to all other 
persons with a substantial interest that, as a practical matter, will be finally 
detennined; 
(b) The Scope Condition that the right of participation should include advance 
notice to the individuals specified in the interest condition and an equal and 
meaningful opportunity to present evidence and arguments that are relevant to 
the dispute at a minimum; 
(c) The Impracticability Proviso that in the event that actual notice or an 
opportunity to be heard is impracticable, the absent interested individual shall 
be provided with an adequate legal representative and the proceeding shall be 
structured so as to give full and fair consideration to the interests of the absent 
individual; and 
(d) The Fair Value of Procedural Justice Proviso that such arrangements shall 
ensure the fair value of the basic liberties, including the right to reasonable 
Advocates' fees in suits for relief from violation of such liberties. 124 
Finally, the Accuracy Principle posits that the arrangements for the resolution of civil 
disputes should be structured to maximize the likelihood of achieving the legally 
con·ect outcome in each proceeding. He went on to create exceptions by stating that a 
~~~Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice , 78 S. Cal. L. Rev, 2004, 181-183. 
1 ~ 3Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 252 . 
1 ~ 4Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 252. 
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procedure may depart from the maximization of accuracy only for the following 
reasons: 
(a) The Substantive Rights proviso that ensures the process of adjudication does 
not unfairly infringe on the substantive rights guaranteed by the basic liberties, 
such as the rights of privacy and freedom of speech; 
(b) Fair Distribution of the Risk of Inaccurate Adjudication Proviso in a bid to 
provide for a fair distribution of the risk of inaccurate adjudication; and 
(c) The Systemic Accuracy Proviso that provides that procedures may also be 
arranged to maximize systemic accuracy where the arrangement will not result 
in inaccuracy in particular cases, in order to maximize systemic accuracy, so 
long as the procedures are announced in advance and create general rules with 
which parties can comply by making a reasonable good faith effort. 
Tyler takes a different approach by stating that there are four key procedural justice 
principles: voice, neutrality, respect, and trust. Voice is connoted bylitigants wanting 
to have the opportunity to tell their side of the story in their own words before 
decisions are made about how to handle the dispute or problem, thus feeling that the 
authority sincerely considered their arguments before making their decision. 
125Neutrality refers to the judges being viewed as principled decision makers who 
make decisions based upon rules and not personal opinions and who apply legal rules 
consistently across people and over cases. Respect refers to litigants perceiving that 
they are viewed as important and valuable and that when they have concems and 
problems both they and their problems will be taken seriously by the legal system. 
Finally, trust is inferred when litigants feel that judges are listening to and considering 
their views; are being honest and open about the basis for their actions; are trying to 
do what is right for everyone involved; and are acting in the interests of the parties, 
not out of personal prejudices. 
Meares & Tyler simplify these principles by classifying them as two elements to 
procedural justice: quality of decision making and quality oftreatment. 126 Effectively, 
procedural justice is only served when procedure and its application guarantees the 
1 ~ 5 R Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 
http;//www.proceduralfaimess .org/~/media/Microsites/Files/procedural-faimess/Tyler.ashxon 6 
Jan4ary 2018. 
1 ~6Tracey L. Meares & Tom R. Tyler,Justice Sotomayor and the Jurisprudence of Procedural Justice 
The Yale Law Journal Forum, The Jurisprudence of Procedural Justice, 2014, 537. 
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quality of decision making by guaranteeing accuracy and courts making objectively 
just substantive decisions vis-a-vis the quality of the treatment that people experience 
when dealing with societal authorities conveying social messages of inclusion of its 
high quality and vice versa, with undue regard to procedural technicalities violating 
its guarantees. 127 
Accordingly, undue regard to procedural technicalities violates procedural justice 
when procedure and its application fails to guarantee the quality of decision making 
seen in the absence of a structure that maximizes the likelihood of achieving the 
legally correct outcome in each proceeding and courts making objectively just 
substantive decisions; and when litigants feel that judges are neither listening to and 
considering their views, being honest and open about the basis for their actions; trying 
to do what is right for everyone involved nor and acting in the interests of the parties. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The proposed test states as follows: Undue regard to procedural technicalities occurs 
when a court or tribunal deals and direct itself with injudicious consideration of any 
laws, rules and procedures in a manner that: 
a) Violates the Overriding objective; 
b) Obstructs and even extinguishes legal rights, in place of facilitating; and 
c) Is procedurally unjust. 
The discussion in this chapter has presented a compelling case for reforms in policy 
and legislation in the adoption of the undue regard to procedural technicalities test. 
The chapter sets the stage for specific recommendations in chapter five intended to 
facilitate the attaining of the overriding objective principle by guaranteeing due regard 
to procedural technicalities and by and large civil justice. 
I ,7 
- As above. 536. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
In line with the theoretical framework, the literature review and the research findings 
in Chapter three, Chapter four made a compelling case for reform in policy and 
legislation towards effective delivery of civil justice by establishing an undue regard 
to procedural technicalities test. By the agency of these findings, this Chapter makes 
recommendations and suggests the way forward by prescribing strategic reform 
measures to ensure due regard to procedural technicalities. 
To adequately address the problem highlighted in Part 1.3 of Chapter one that outlines 
the problem statement. Chapters Two, Three and Four evaluated the need for an 
undue regard to procedural technicalities legal test. This appraisal meets the aims of 
the inquiry, namely: (a) to analyze the postulates of Article 159(2)(d) of the 
Constitution that establishes that administration of justice is to be done without undue 
regard to procedural technicalities; (b) to probe if courts orchestrate undue regard to 
procedural technicalities in the conduct of their business; (c) to evaluate the effects of 
undue regard to procedural technicalities in the civil justice system; and (d) to 
recommend a test to guide the courts in determining what due regard to procedural 
technicalities is. 
The study was based on the hypothesis set out in part 1.7 of chapt~r one, namely 
"There is need for a proper delineation of what amounts to due regard to procedural 
technicalities." This was ascertained by the findings in Chapters Two, Three and four. 
To wit, the absence of a defined and established legal test has resulted in an equivocal 
legal provision that does not effectively aid the civil justice system. The 
recommendations in this Chapter outline the necessary steps for inculcation of this 
legal test in the pursuit of civil justice. 
Pursuant to appraisal of texts, various legal principles and case law, a progressive test 
was forged. The submitted test provides that undue regard to procedural technicalities 
occurs when a court or tribunal deals and directs itself with injudicious consideration 
of any laws, rules and procedures in a manner that: violates the Overriding objective; 
obstructs and even extinguishes legal rights, in place of facilitating; and is 
procedurally unjust. 
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5.2 Recommended Policy and Legislation Reforms 
Drawing from the discourse in Chapter four, the need for statutory intervention to 
improve the application of the undue regard of procedural technicalities in the 
administration of civil justice cannot be emphasized enough. At the hand of that, this 
study recommends reform in policy and legislation by proposing the test which states 
as follows: Undue regard to procedural technicalities occurs when a court or tribunal 
deals and direct itself with injudicious consideration of any laws, rules and procedures 
in a manner that: violates the Overriding objective; in place of facilitating obstructs 
and even extinguishes legal rights; and is procedurally unjust. 
The Rules committee established under the Civil Procedure Act ought to review, 
consider and assimilate the proposed undue to procedural technicalities test into law 
pursuant to its the power to make rules for any matters relating to the procedure of 
civil courts inconsistent with the Act. 128 
Alternatively, the Chief Justice may, by the power vested in him to issue practice 
notes or directions to resolve procedural difficulties arising under the Act in order to 
facilitate the attainment of the overriding objective of the Act in consultation with the 
Rules Committee. 129 As outlined in the appraisal in the preceding chapters, undue 
regard to procedural technicalities directly affects the overriding objective as it has 
implications on the resolution of civil disputes in terms of justice, expediency, 
proportionality and their affordability. 
The final recommendation emanates from the Chief Justice's Working Party on Civil 
Justice Reform in the United Kingdom Chief Justice Refonn that proposed the 
'Underlying objective' to assist in the interpretation and application of rules of court, 
practice directions and procedural jurisprudence and to serve as a statement of the 
legitimate aims of judicial case management, in lieu of the conventional and arguably 
ineffective overriding objective. The Report outlined the underlying objective of civil 
procedure as: · 
(i) Increasing cost- effectiveness in the court's procedures; 
(ii) The expeditious disposal of cases; 
1'8 5· . - ect10n 81, Cap 21 , Laws of Kenya. 
129 As above,* 3. 
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(i) Promoting a sense of reasonable proportion and procedural economy m 
respect ofhow cases are litigated; 
(ii) Promoting greater equality between parties; 
(iii) Facilitating settlement; and 
(iv) Distributing the court's resources fairly, always reco'gnizing that the primary 
aim of judicial case management should be to secure the just resolution of the 
parties' dispute in accordance with their substantive rights. 130 
This breakdown takes cognizance of express and elaborate legitimate aims of judicial 
case management thus providing a more comprehensive test as compared to the vital 
but basal overriding objective. 
13° Civil Justice Reform, Final Report of the Chief Justice 's Working Party On Civil Justice 
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